
Training & Regulations
SAIL levels explained: Understanding UK SORA risk assessment
Technical guide to SAIL levels under UK SORA. Learn how Ground Risk, Air Risk, and OSOs combine to determine your drone operation's assurance requirements.
From low-risk missions to complex beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations, SAIL levels shape the regulatory requirements operators must satisfy before receiving a SORA Operational Authorisation.
The importance of SAIL levels is becoming increasingly evident as organisations look to deploy scalable drone programmes.
heliguy™ has secured a UK SORA SAIL II Operational Authorisation to conduct remote BLVOS DJI Dock 3 missions on behalf of Network Rail. Our regulatory team can work with your organisation to help you build UK SORA applications.
Key takeaways
SAIL stands for Specific Assurance and Integrity Level. It defines the depth of safety evidence an operator must provide, not an approval in itself.
SAIL levels range from I (lowest assurance burden) to VI (highest), derived by combining a Ground Risk Class (GRC) score with an Air Risk Class (ARC) rating.
GRC assesses potential harm to people on the ground; ARC assesses the likelihood of collision with manned aircraft. Both can be reduced through targeted mitigations.
The Concept of Operations (ConOps) is the foundational document of any SORA application - it must be complete, accurate, and iterated until the SAIL level is both correct and achievable.
Each SAIL level maps to Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs), each requiring Low, Medium, or High robustness of evidence.
Higher SAIL levels (IV-VI) require formal Safety Management Systems, independent technical validation, and in some cases evidence approaching manned aviation standards.
Expert insight
"A common misconception is that SAIL is an approval in itself. In reality, the SAIL level defines the degree of assurance required to demonstrate that an operation can be conducted safely. Understanding this distinction is key to developing a successful UK SORA application."
— Tom Anderson, heliguy™ Regulatory Specialist
What is a SAIL level?
Specific Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL) is a risk-based classification used within the UK SORA (Specific Operations Risk Assessment) methodology.
The SAIL level determines the depth and robustness of safety evidence, operational procedures, technical controls, and organisational structures that an operator must put in place before the UK CAA will grant authorisation to fly.
Lower-risk operations are subject to fewer requirements, while more complex missions require greater levels of technical, operational, and organisational assurance.
SAIL levels range from 1 to 6. The higher the SAIL level, the more robust the required safety mitigations and supporting evidence.

Why are SAIL levels important?
SAIL levels are effectively the mechanism that translates operational risk into regulatory requirements.
Once a SAIL level has been determined, it influences:
Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs);
Pilot and crew competency requirements;
Technical mitigation requirements;
Organisational responsibilities;
Safety management expectations;
Evidence and documentation requirements.
This ensures that safety measures remain proportionate to the risk profile of the operation.

For example, a simple rural survey mission may require relatively limited assurance, whereas a BVLOS inspection programme operating near critical infrastructure may require significantly greater operational controls and evidence.
How are SAIL levels calculated?
SAIL levels are derived by combining two independent risk assessments - Ground Risk Class (GRC) and Air Risk Class (ARC).
This determines the depth of evidence required across a set of Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs).

The three stages are sequential but iterative: an operator who finds their initial SAIL level unacceptably high can refine their operational concept, strengthen their mitigations, and re-assess.
A critical distinction: The SAIL level is not an approval. It is the assurance burden that an operator must satisfy to earn one. A SAIL II authorisation can still be refused if the OSO evidence is inadequate. A SAIL IV application can succeed if every objective is properly evidenced.
What is Ground Risk Class (GRC)?
Ground Risk Class quantifies the potential harm to people on the ground in the event of an uncontrolled UAS impact. It is a consequence measure, not a probability measure.
GRC is determined by factors such as:
The maximum characteristic dimension and the maximum possible speed of the drone.
The intrinsic GRC (iGRC) footprint based on flight volume, contingency volume, and initial ground risk buffer.
The maximum population density within the iGRC footprint.
GRC is expressed as an integer from 1 (lowest consequence) to 10 (highest).
Intrinsic Ground Risk Class Table
The following table reproduces the iGRC determination matrix from Table 3 of UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947.

If population density values are not available, not accurate, or an applicant would rather use qualitative descriptors for the iGRC table, the following approximations may be used as guidance - as outlined in CAP 3239C: Determining Population Density.
Descriptor | Max Density (ppl/km²) | Examples |
|---|---|---|
Controlled / Extremely Remote | 0 | Restricted military zones, large bodies of water, inaccessible land |
Few People May Be Present | 5 | Unpopulated areas with public right of way, small hamlets, moorland |
Sparsely Populated | 50 | Hamlets, clusters of farms, small industrial sites |
Lightly Populated | 500 | Villages, medium industrial areas, small campsites |
Moderately Populated | 5,000 | Towns, residential homes, large industrial areas |
Heavily Populated | 50,000 | Cities, large blocks of flats, small/medium festivals |
Densest Populated | >50,000 | City centres, dense high-rise, large festivals/sporting events |
The UK CAA may also allow applicants to provide appropriate population density maps.
Table 4 in UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947 presents the suggested optimal grid size for authoritative maps, based on different maximum operating heights.
Max. Height (AGL) in Feet | Max. Height (AGL) in Metres | Suggested Optimal Grid Size (metre x metre) |
|---|---|---|
500 | 152 | > 200 x 200 |
1,000 | 305 | > 400 x 400 |
2,500 | 762 | > 1,000 x 1,000 |
5,000 | 1,524 | > 2,000 x 2,000 |
10,000 | 3,048 | > 4,000 x 4,000 |
20,000 | 6,096 | > 5,000 x 5,000 |
60,000 | 18,288 | > 10,000 x 10,000 |
GRC mitigations
Once the intrinsic GRC is established, operators can apply mitigations to reduce it.
UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (Annex B, Table 5) defines four mitigation classes: M1A, M1B, M1C, and M2.
The GRC reduction available from each depends on the robustness level (Low, Medium, and High) at which it is evidenced. Not all mitigations are available at all robustness levels.
"Robustness means the property of mitigation measures resulting from combining the safety gain provided by the mitigation measures and the level of assurance and integrity that the safety gain has been achieved."
- UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947, Artcle 2(5)
Mitigation | Description | GRC Reduction |
|---|---|---|
M1A: Sheltering | Strategic mitigation - credit for reduction in effective population density when people are sheltered inside buildings the UA is not expected to penetrate. Applies when not overflying large open-air assemblies of people. A UA not expected to penetrate a standard dwelling qualifies automatically. | Low: −1 Medium: −2 High: N/A |
M1A: Sheltering | Strategic mitigation - restriction of the operation to reduce population exposure. Examples include flying only over controlled ground areas, avoiding populated zones, restricting to specific geographic corridors, or limiting time windows. Evidence must demonstrate the restriction is enforced and monitored. | Low: N/A Medium: −1 High: −2 |
M1C: Ground Observation | Tactical mitigation - deployment of trained ground observers who actively monitor the area beneath the flight path and can halt the operation if uninvolved persons enter. Observers must be positioned, briefed, and in real-time communication with the remote pilot. | Low: −1 Medium: N/A High: N/A |
M2: Impact Dynamics Reduced | Effects of UA impact dynamics are reduced - typically via a ballistic parachute recovery system, frangible structures, or equivalent means of limiting kinetic energy transfer at impact. The system must be tested or certified to a recognised standard with reliability evidenced. | Low: N/A Medium: −1 High: −2 |
What is Air Risk Class (ARC)?
Air Risk Class assesses the likelihood of an encounter with manned aircraft during the operation.
There are four levels of ARC:
ARC-a (minimal risk)
ARC-b (Low risk)
ARC-c (Medium risk)
ARC-d (High risk)
The initial ARC is set by the airspace classification and typical traffic density of the operational area before any mitigations are applied.
This flow diagramme (Figure 5, UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947) provides an air risk characterisation flow chart describing the UK SORA air risk model characterisation process.

Key elements within the flowchart are explained below.
Term | Description |
|---|---|
Atypical | Improbable encounter rate with crewed traffic due to proximity of ground infrastructure (e.g. within 100ft of a building, within 50ft of a linear structure such as a railway or road, or within private property below 50ft). Not a separate airspace class - may exist within any classification. |
Above FL660 - high altitude | Mix of crewed military, experimental, HALE UAS, space launch, supersonic civil, and high-altitude balloons. Cannot be treated as segregated without further consideration and mitigation. Ingress/egress and contingency management also require special consideration due to risk to aircraft in airspace below. |
Class A | Exclusively IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) traffic under ATC (Air Traffic Control) separation. Predominantly large commercial transport (Type-2 encounter). Highest severity consequences justify maximum initial ARC. |
Class C or D | In areas of known IFPs (airways, SIDs, STARs, IAPs): predominantly large commercial transport under IFR separation → Type-2 → ARC-d. |
Class C or D: Outside known IFP (Instrument Flight Procedures) areas | Smaller GA aircraft VFR (Visual Flight Rules) with self-separation via see-and-avoid → Type-1 → ARC-c. |
Class D: Below 500ft | Traffic is known, cooperative, and flies below 500ft only by exception (with ATC knowledge). Lower encounter rate can be predicted and controlled, allowing a reduced initial ARC. |
Class E/G (All altitudes - above and below 500ft) | VFR traffic potentially unknown and uncooperative (no EC or VHF requirement). Predominantly small GA/light commercial using see-and-avoid → Type-1 → ARC-c. No 500ft differentiation applies: unknown/uncooperative traffic may descend without warning, preventing a lower ARC characterisation before strategic mitigation. |
ARC Mitigations
ARC can be reduced through either strategic mitigations — applied at the planning stage and embedded in the ConOps — or tactical mitigations that operate in real time during flight.
Strategic mitigations | Tactical mitigations |
|---|---|
• Restricting the operation to lower-density airspace volumes or specific altitude bands. • Defining flight corridors that avoid known traffic patterns, instrument approach paths, and aerodrome circuit areas. • Obtaining a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with the relevant ATC unit or aerodrome authority. • Coordinating with NATS and filing NOTAMs to make the operation visible to other airspace users. • Applying for a Restricted or Danger Area (RA/DA) or Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) where appropriate. | • Visual observers (VOs) positioned to provide 360-degree situational awareness and relay traffic information to the remote pilot. • Electronic conspicuity devices — ADS-B out, FLARM, or Mode S transponders — that make the UAS detectable by TCAS-equipped aircraft and ground-based surveillance. • Ground-based or airborne Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) systems providing automated conflict detection. • Real-time airspace monitoring and alerting services integrated into the ground control station. |
For BVLOS operations where no visual observer is present, tactical ARC mitigations become critical. The absence of a human observer must be compensated by technical or procedural means — typically electronic conspicuity combined with ATC coordination or a DAA solution — and this must be demonstrated to the CAA's satisfaction through evidence of system reliability and failure mode management.
Deriving the SAIL Level
With a final (post-mitigation) GRC and a final (post-mitigation) ARC established, the SAIL level is read directly from the combination matrix below.
This is the definitive matrix as published in the UK CAA SORA guidance and cross-referenced with JARUS SORA v2.5, as adapted by 2019/947.
Final GRC | Residual ARC a | Residual ARC b | Residual ARC c | Residual ARC d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Final GRC ≤2 | SAIL I | SAIL II | SAIL IV | SAIL VI |
Final GRC 3 | SAIL II | SAIL II | SAIL IV | SAIL VI |
Final GRC 4 | SAIL III | SAIL III | SAIL IV | SAIL VI |
Final GRC 5 | SAIL IV | SAIL IV | SAIL IV | SAIL VI |
Final GRC 6 | SAIL V | SAIL V | SAIL V | SAIL VI |
Final GRC 7 | SAIL VI | SAIL VI | SAIL VI | SAIL VI |
Final GRC >7 | Certified category | Certified category | Certified category | Certified category |
SAIL Levels And Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs)
Once the SAIL level is determined, it drives a set of Operational Safety Objectives.
OSOs define what safety performance must be demonstrated, covering everything from pilot competency and equipment reliability to emergency procedures and organisational oversight.
They are the mechanism by which SAIL translates into a concrete evidence checklist.
Each OSO is assigned a required robustness level at each SAIL level: Low, Medium, and High.
The table below, taken from UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947, shows the corresponding OSOs per SAIL. In the table:
NR means not required.
L means low robustness.
M means medium robustness.
H means high robustness.
OSO ID | OSO Description | SAIL I | SAIL II | SAIL III | SAIL IV | SAIL V | SAIL VI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
OSO01 | Ensure the operator is competent and/or proven | NR | L | M | H | H | H |
OSO02 | UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity | NR | NR | L | M | H | H |
OSO03 | UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity | L | L | M | M | H | H |
OSO04 | UAS components are designed to an airworthiness standard | NR | NR | NR | L | M | H |
OSO05 | UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability | NR | NR | L | M | H | H |
OSO06 | C3 link performance is appropriate for the operation | M | L | L | M | H | H |
OSO07 | Conformity check of the UAS configuration | L | L | M | M | H | H |
OSO08 | Operational procedures are defined, validated, and adhered to | L | M | H | H | H | H |
OSO09 | Remote crew trained and current | L | L | M | M | H | H |
OSO13 | External services supporting UAS operations are adequate to the operation | L | L | M | H | H | H |
OSO16 | Multi-crew coordination | L | L | M | M | H | H |
OSO17 | Remote crew is fit to operate | L | L | M | M | H | H |
OSO18 | Automatic protection of the flight envelope from Human Error | NR | NR | L | M | H | H |
OSO19 | Safe recovery from Human Error | NR | NR | L | M | M | H |
OSO20 | Human factors evaluation | NR | L | L | M | M | H |
OSO23 | Environmental conditions assessed and addressed | L | L | M | M | H | H |
OSO24 | UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions | NR | NR | M | H | H | H |
SAIL levels in practice
SAIL levels are not theoretical constructs — they define the real-world regulatory pathway for every Specific Category drone operation in the UK.
A few illustrative examples show how the GRC/ARC combination plays out across typical operation types:
Rural VLOS survey, small UAS (<1 m), sparse population, Class G low-level airspace:
GRC 1–2, ARC-a → SAIL I. Minimal evidence burden; basic operational procedures and pilot competency documentation sufficient.
Semi-rural BVLOS infrastructure inspection, medium UAS (1–3 m), sparse population, Class G with limited GA traffic:
GRC 2–3 (mitigated), ARC-b → SAIL II. Documented procedures, C2 link reliability evidence, electronic conspicuity, and route-specific risk assessment required.
Suburban VLOS inspection, medium UAS, populated area, proximity to ATZ:
GRC 4–5, ARC-c → SAIL IV. Formal SMS, structured training, independent equipment validation, and ATC coordination required.
Large UAS BVLOS corridor, controlled airspace, near major aerodrome:
GRC 5+, ARC-d → SAIL V–VI. Evidence approaching manned aviation standards; independent safety review likely required.
heliguy™ obtains SAIL II for remote BVLOS Dock operations
heliguy™ recently secured a UK SORA SORA II to operate DJI Dock 3s BVLOS, on behalf of Network Rail.
The flights - at sites in Romford and Glouster - will be conducted hundreds of miles away by heliguy™ pilots in our Remote Operations Command Centre.
The authorisation required GRC and ARC assessments tailored to a live railway corridor environment, a ConOps that addressed remote launch, recovery, and monitoring without on-site crew, and OSO evidence packages built from the ground up for a drone-in-a-box deployment at scale.
It shows how obtaining SORA is possible and how a well-designed operational concept - with careful geographic containment and targeted ARC mitigations - can keep remote BVLOS deployments within a manageable assurance level.
How heliguy™ can help
Successfully navigating UK SORA requires more than familiarity with the methodology.
It requires the ability to design an operational concept that genuinely minimises risk, the technical understanding to select and evidence appropriate mitigations, and the regulatory experience to know what the CAA expects at each SAIL level - and how to deliver it.
heliguy™ has invested in its regulatory team and wider infrastructure to accelerate UK SORA success and has a track record of achieving regulatory milestones.
We support organisations across the full authorisation lifecycle, including:
Operational concept development
Ground Risk and Air Risk assessments
OSO evidence packages
BVLOS strategy and drone-in-a-box deployment planning
CAA application management
Ongoing regulatory compliance
Summary
SAIL levels translate operational risk into a proportionate regulatory requirement - a calibration of how much safety evidence an operator must produce to earn an Operational Authorisation from the UK CAA.
The critical insight is that SAIL is not fate. A well-designed operational concept - one that scopes its geography carefully, applies the right mitigations, and iterates the ConOps until the risk picture is optimised - can legitimately achieve a lower SAIL level than an operation that accepts default assumptions.
Every SAIL level is earnable through good operational design.
References and sources
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a SAIL level in UK SORA?

Is a SAIL level the same as an approval?

What SAIL level do I need for BVLOS operations?

What is the difference between Ground Risk Class (GRC) and Air Risk Class (ARC)?

Can I reduce my SAIL level?

What does robustness mean in the context of UK SORA?

What are Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs)?

